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Abstract. The aim of this paper is to elucidate the mereological structure of complex states 
of affairs without relying on the problematic notion of structural universals. For this task 
tools from graph theory, lattice theory, and the theory of relational systems are employed. 
Our starting point is the mereology of similarity structures. Since similarity structures are 
structured sets, their mereology can be considered as a generalization of the mereology of 
ordinary sets. In general, the mereological systems arising from similarity structures turn 
out to be not Boolean but Heyting systems. Employing Armstrong’s notion of thick 
particulars, similarity structures are shown to capture the mereological structure of complex 
“chemical states of affairs” such as “being butane” or “being isobutane”, structural 
universals are not needed. 
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1. Introduction. Let us subscribe to a factual ontology according to which the world is a 
world of states of affairs (cf. Armstrong 1997). A factual ontology cannot be content to 
baldly assert that the world is a heap of opaque states of affairs, rather, it should tell us 
something about the structure of states of affairs and how they are related. Even if the 
partisans of a factual ontology agree on the issue what are atomic states of affairs, there is 
less than full agreement on what is to be understood by complex states of affairs and their 
structure. The main reason for this disagreement is the problematic notion of structural 
universals allegedly involved in the constitution of complex states of affairs. On the one 
hand, David Lewis put forward some strong arguments against structural universals (cf. 
Lewis 1986), contending that the alleged structural universals violate the principle of 
uniqueness of composition, or that they seem to require the repetition of simpler universals. 
On the other hand, many philosophers asserted, “any theory of universals worth its salt 
must be able to offer an account of structural universals” (Bigelow and Pargetter 1989, 
219). This requirement may be difficult to satisfy. According to Bigelow and Pargetter, 
Lewis conclusively showed that mereology does not help much for the development of such 
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a theory, since the “is-a-part of” relation is too weak to cope with the intricate pattern of 
entailments that structures such as methane, butane, and similar complex states of affairs 
exhibit: 
 
Given the intrinsic nature of methane, there is a complex pattern of entailments 
that requires explanation. If a molecule instantiates methane it necessarily 
follows that there are parts of the molecule which instantiate the other 
universals hydrogen, carbon, bonded; also that there are four times the number 
of instantiations of hydrogen than carbon; also that the bonded relation is 
instantiated four times by carbon-hydrogen pairs, never by hydrogen-hydrogen 
pairs, and that no hydrogen atom is bonded more than once; and so on. With 
such rich pattern of entailments to explain … the chance of explaining them all 
using no more than the “is part of” relation is slim (Bigelow and Pargetter 1989, 
220). 
 
A result of this paper is that Bigelow and Pargetter’s verdict on the chances of mereology is 
untenable. A neat mereological analysis of complex states of affairs will be given that does 
not depend on the problematic notion of structural universals. The proposed account to be 
developed in this paper clearly distinguishes between two levels: 
 
(1)  The mereological level dealing with parts of complex states of affairs. 
 
(2) The constitutional level dealing with particulars and basic monadic or relational 
universals as the constituents of atomic states of affairs. 
 
According to (1) a complex mereological state is described as a mereological whole that has 
less complex states of affairs as its parts. The level (2) deals with the internal, non-
mereological structure of the atomic parts of complex states of affairs, i.e., with the 
individuals and universals that constitute the atomic states of affairs that are parts of 
complex states of affairs. With respect to the constitutional level (2), we closely follow 
Armstrong’s account, i.e. the basic building blocks of states of affairs will be individuals and 
(monadic and relational universals (cf. Armstrong 1997).  
For the convenience of the reader let us briefly recall the basics of Armstrong’s approach. A 
factual ontology assumes that the world is a world of states of affairs. States of affairs are 
constituted by particulars a, b, c, d, … and monadic or relational universals F, G, B, H, C, … 
to yield states of affairs such as Ha, Gb, cBd, … to be interpreted as the states that a is H, 
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b is G, c and d are relata of the relation B, and so on. Universals may be understood as 
state-of-affairs types (Armstrong 1997, 127), or “unsaturated” entities requiring to be 
completed by particulars in order to yield actual states of affairs. Among particulars one 
may distinguish between thin and thick particulars. A thin particular is a particular in 
abstraction from all its properties and relations, the particular qua particular only (cf. 
Armstrong 1989, 52). Thin particulars may be conceived as limiting cases that are obtained 
from (more or less) thick particulars such as Fa or (F&G)b after having abstracted away all 
their monadic properties.   In our daily practice, we seldom deal with “really thick” 
particulars that take into account all non-relational aspects, nor are we used to be 
confronted with thin particulars; the particulars we usually meet are of an intermediate 
thickness such as Fa, (F&G)a, (F&G&H)b (cf. Armstrong 1989, 52f). In order to simplify 
matters as far as possible, in the following we distinguish only between two classes: thin 
particulars a, b, c, … on the one hand, and thick particulars Fa, Gb, (F&G)c, on the other 
hand, thereby ignoring different degrees of thickness. 
The special mark of universals is repeatibility, i.e. one and the same universal, say H 
(hydrogen), can be instantiated in several states of affairs Ha, Hb, … . Obviously, states of 
affairs such as Fa, Gb lack repeatibility. Hence they are to be considered as particulars. More 
precisely, they are thick particulars. Armstrong called this the “victory of particularity over 
universality” (ibidem, chapter 8). This victory has an important consequence. Conceiving 
universals as states-of-affairs types that yield states of affairs by being saturated through 
appropriate particulars it is possible that universals are completed by appropriate thick 
particulars. For instance, assume that a, b, and c are thin particulars, H and O are the 
monadic universals “hydrogen” and “oxygen”, respectively, and  denotes a binary 
universal “bonded”. Then we may consider the complex state of affairs HaObHc that 
obtains iff the thick particulars Ha, Ob, and Hc are bonded forming together a molecule of 
water (H2O). 
Armstrong and virtually all other authors who dealt with relational states of affairs that 
involve some kind of bonding assume without further argument that the bonding universal 
has to be completed by thin particulars only. There is no reason, however, to make this 
assumption. It makes perfectly good sense to assume that there are relational universals 
such as bonding that are defined for thick particulars, such that the states of affairs takes 
the form, say, FaGb as is the case for oxygen molecules OaOb. Restricting the domains 
of relational universals to thin particulars only, would render it impossible to combine thick 
particulars to complex states of affairs. This seems highly implausible. From a scientific 
point of view, chemical bonding obtains, or does not obtain, for a rather limited class of 
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particulars, namely, for atoms or molecules of some kind, i.e. for certain thick particulars 
such as Ha, Ob, Cc etc. This is reflected already in the familiar structure formulas of 
chemistry such as H2O, SO2, which should be interpreted as a kind of shorthand for 
describing complex states of affairs such as HaObHc and OdSeOf. A crucial 
assumption of this paper is to conceive the relational universal bonding  as a universal 
that is completed by thick particulars. 
Replacing relational states of type xy by states of type FxGy is not just a minor formal 
variant of the ontological analysis of complex states of affairs. Rather it turns out to be the 
first step of a revision that leads to a much better mereological analysis of complex states 
than that of Armstrong: As will be shown, Armstrong’s mereological analysis of complex 
states such as “methane” or “isobutane” amounts to nothing more than counting the 
number (n) of atoms and the number (m) of bondings that can be found in such a molecule. 
Consequently, for Armstrong the resulting mereological structure of the molecule is just the 
Boolean algebra P({1, …, n+m}), i.e. the power set of the {1, 2, …, n+m}. This Boolean 
mereology is a far cry from the specific characterization of these molecules encapsulated in 
their chemical structure formulas. Actually, a much better and more precise mereological 
analysis of complex states of affairs can be formulated in the framework of in Armstrong’s 
factual ontology provided we replace Boolean mereological systems by Heyting systems. 
This improved analysis can distinguish between isomere states of affairs as presented by 
the notorious case of butane and isobutane. 
The shortcomings of Armstrong’s ontological analysis of complex states are avoided by 
employing the conceptual apparatus of mereology in a novel way. Mereology comprises 
more than just the traditional Boolean mereology of sets. Mereology as a general theory of 
parthood is more general than the elementary part of set theory as Lewis contended. In our 
analysis of complex states of affairs there is no need for structural universals. They turn out 
to be a useful façon de parler, but they carry no ontological weight. The mereological theory 
of complex states of affairs to be developed in the following offers an eliminative account 
of structural universals. 
The outline of this paper is as follows: In section 2 the formal foundations for the 
investigations of the entire paper are laid down. In particular, a detailed analysis of the 
structural mereology of similarity structures is set up.1 This provides the basis for the study 
of the mereology of complex states carried out in section 3. There for every complex state 
of affairs C a mereological system PART(C) of structural parts of C is defined. The 
                                                
1 For more general, somewhat different accounts of structural mereology see (Mormann 2009, 2010). 
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mereological systems PART(C) allows us to distinguish between isomeric states of affairs 
such as “being butane” and “being isobutane”. In section 4 our approach is compared with 
some recent attempts to come to terms with problems related to structural universals. 
First, we will deal with Pagés’s Structural Universals and Formal Relations (Pagés 2002), 
then with Kalhat’s Structural Universals and the Principle of Uniqueness of Composition 
(Kalhat 2008). In section 5 we close with some remarks on how the account of this paper 
can be generalized to deal with wider classes of complex states of affairs. 
 
 
2. Mereology of Similarity Structures. A similarity structure (S, ~) is defined as a set S 
endowed with a reflexive and symmetric binary relation ~ ⊆ S × S. Two elements are said to 
be similar iff (a, b) ∈ ~. As usual this is denoted by a ~ b. Similarity structures may be 
conceived as simple graphs: the vertices of the graph are the elements of S and two 
different vertices are similar iff they are the vertices of the same edge. For instance, if S = 
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5} the graph (2.1) represents the similarity structure (S, ~) according to which 
each of the elements 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 is similar to itself, 1 and 2 are similar, 2 and 3 are similar, 
2 and 5 are similar, 2 and 4 are similar, and no other similarities between the elements of S 
occur. In other words, the graph structure is to be interpreted in such a way that it gives 
complete information about all matters of similarity concerning its elements. If we deal with 
several similarity structures and have to distinguish their similarity relations, they are 
denoted by (S, ~S) and (T, ~T). More formally, a similarity structure (S, ~S) may be 
characterized as a structured set or a relational systems in the sense of the mathematical 
theory of relational systems. The similarity relation of (S, ~S) may be identified with the 
subset ~S := {(x, y); x ~ y} ⊆ S × S. 
This reinterpretation of similarity structures is useful for elucidating their mereological 
structure. Let S be any non-empty set. According to Lewis (Lewis 1991, 1.2, 3ff) the non-
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empty subsets T of a set S may be considered as parts of S and the set-theoretical 
inclusion ⊆ as the mereological parthood relation. In mathematics, the set of subsets of a 
set S is called the powerset of S and denoted by P(S). As is well known P(S) is a (complete) 
Boolean algebra with bottom element Ø the empty set. Hence, the mereological system of 
nonempty subsets of S is a Boolean algebra from which the bottom element 0 has been 
removed.  
Lewis, as most other mereologists, excludes the empty set Ø from the realm of the 
mereology of sets. In this paper we do not follow this convention. For technical convenience 
it is assumed that a classical mereological system is a Boolean algebra in the ordinary 
mathematical sense, i.e. possessing a bottom element 0 corresponding to Ø. More generally, 
all mereological systems considered in this paper are assumed to have a bottom element 0. 
This convention simplifies definitions and calculations but does not carry any philosophical 
weight, i.e., everything would go through without it. 
From now on PART(S) denotes the set of subsets of S. The relational system (PART(S), ⊆) 
is called a classical or Boolean mereological system (cf. Simons (1987)). Having a 
mereology for sets, one may ask whether there is also a mereology for structured sets, in 
particular for structured sets such as similarity structures (S, ~). Lewis did not treat this 
problem, and, as far as I know, philosophers never dealt explicitly with this question. There 
exists, however, an extended literature on the topic of parts of structured sets and 
relational systems in mathematics, see Lawvere and Schanuel (1996) or Lawvere and 
Rosebrugh (2003). In this paper we will restrict our attention to the special case of 
similarity structures (S, ~). 
A natural starting point for a structural mereology is the question, what are the parts of a 
structured set such as a similarity structure (S, ~)? A trivial answer is simply to forget 
about the structure of S and to take the parts of the set S as the parts of the structured 
set (S, ~). A more interesting proposal is to attempt somehow to take into account the 
extra structure of S for the definition of the structural parts of (S, ~). In other words, the 
similarity relation ~ should play a role in the definition of the structural parts of (S, ~). The 
following definition of structural parts is a natural way to achieve this aim: 
 
(2.2) Definition. A structural part of (S, ~S) is a similarity structure (T, ~T) such that T ⊆ S 
and ~T ⊆ ~S. The set of structural parts of (S, ~S) is denoted by PART(S, ~). Then a partial 
order on PART(S, ~) is defined by (U, ~U) ≤ (V, ~V) := U ⊆ V and ~U ⊆ ~V (U, V ⊆ S). (U, ~U) 
is said to be a part of (V, ~V) iff (U, ~U) ≤ (V, ~V). The set of structural parts of (S, ~) 
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endowed with this partial order is also denoted by PART(S, ~). The top element of this 
order is (S, ~S) and the bottom element is the empty similarity structure (Ø, ~Ø).♦ 
 
The definition (2.2) is a natural generalization of Lewis’s definition of parts of sets (cf. 
Lewis 1991, 3ff). Instead of arbitrary sets S we consider appropriate ordered pairs (S, ~S) 
of sets such that (T, ~T) is a part of (S, ~S) iff T is part of S and ~T is part of ~S in the 
ordinary sense. Indeed, the ordinary mereology of sets may be included in our generalized 
approach as follows: For a set S define its diagonal D(S) as D(S) := {(x,x); x ∈ S}. Then (S, 
D(S)) is a similarity structure and (T, D(T)) ≤ (S, D(S)) holds if and only if T ⊆ S, i.e., T is a 
part of S in the ordinary sense. In other words, the mereology of structural parts of 
“discrete” similarity structures (S, D(S)) is isomorphic to the mereology of sets S in the 
usual sense. 
The generalization (2.2) of the parthood relation ⊆ from sets to pairs of sets may look 
innocent enough, nevertheless, as we shall see, it ushers us outside the realm of classical 
Boolean mereology. The mereological systems PART(S, ~) defined in (2.2) turn out to be 
non-Boolean mereological systems. In other words, Boolean mereology is too narrow a 
framework to capture all kinds of reasonable mereological systems, in particular, the 
mereological systems arising from similarity structures (S, ~). 
Intuitively formulated (2.2) stipulates that similarity be hereditary from a part to its whole: 
If (T, ~T) ≤ (S, ~S) and a, b ∈ T satisfy a ~T b, then a ~S b holds as well. On the other hand, 
the reverse implication between the similarity relation ~T and ~S may not hold: Intuitively 
this may be formulated as that it may be the case that the coherence of the whole (S, ~S) is 
strictly larger than the coherence of its parts (T, ~T), i.e., it may be the case that for a, b ∈ 
T one has a ~S b but a ~T b does not hold.   
The definition (2.2) of structural parts is completely analogous to the definition of subsets 
as parts of sets. Thus, if one accepts subsets as parts of sets, there is no reason not to 
accept structural subsets as structural parts of similarity structures. For reasons that will 
become clear in the following, it seems expedient to single out the following special parts of 
similarity structures: 
 
(2.3) Definition. Let (S, ~S) be a similarity structure. 
(i)   A structural part (T, ~T) of (S, ~S) is discrete iff for a, b ∈ T one has a ~T b iff a = b, 
i.e., (T, ~T) is discrete iff ~T = D(T). 
(ii)   A structural part (T, ~T) of (S, ~S) is full if and only if for a, b ∈ T a ~T b iff a ~S b.♦  
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The discrete parts of (S, ~S) can be identified with the parts of the set S, i.e. with the 
subsets of S. Thus, the theory of structural parts of similarity structures (S, ~S) comprises 
as a part the theory of parts of sets S. If (S, ~S) itself is discrete, i.e. ~S = D(S), then 
PART(S, ~S) = PART(S). 
In order to characterize PART(S, ~) structurally and to understand why it is in general not 
Boolean we need some definitions and results from lattice theory (cf. Davey and Priestley 
1990, Grätzer 1998).  
Recall that a complete lattice (L, ≤) is a partially ordered set such that every subset P ⊆ L 
has a least upper bound (supremum) VP ∈ L and a greatest lower bound (infimum) ΛP ∈ L. 
The least upper bound of P = {a, b} is denoted by a ∨ b and its greatest lower bound is 
denoted by a ∧ b. The least upper bound VL is denoted by 1 and called the top element of 
L. Dually, the greatest lower bound of ΛØ is denoted by 0 and called the bottom element of 
L. 
Boolean algebras are well known to be lattices that can be characterized by the following 
requirements: 
 
(2.4) Lemma. A lattice L is Boolean iff it satisfies the following two requirements:  
 
(i)    L is distributive, i.e. for all x, y, z ∈ L one has x ∧ (y ∨ z) = (x ∧ y) ∨ (x ∧ z);  
 
(ii)   L is complemented, i.e. for all x ∈ L there is an x* such that x ∧ x* = 0 and x ∨ x* = 
1. The element x* is called the (Boolean) complement of x.♦ 
 
The partial order PART(S, ~) is a lattice, the supremum VK and the infimum ΛK of K ⊆ S are 
just the set-theoretical union ∪K and the intersection ∩K, respectively, endowed with the 
similarity relations inherited from S. The following simple example shows that the lattice 
PART(S, ~) of structural parts of a similarity structure may not be Boolean: The similarity 
structure  
 
(2.6)                xyz  
 
has as proper part the similarity structure consisting of the isolated vertices x, y, and z: 
 
                                                              x       y       z 
Obviously this substructure lacks a complement.  
In other words, PART(S, ~) violates the so called law of weak supplementation (WSP) which 
many mereologists consider as an indispensable feature of any “reasonable” mereological 
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system (cf. Simons (1987)). A fortiori, PART(S, ~) is in general not a Boolean mereological 
system. It has to be characterized differently. 
 
(2.7) Definition. Let (H, ≤) be a complete distributive lattice. For a ∈ H, K ⊆ H define a ∧ K 
to be the set {a ∧ k; k ∈ K}. 
 
(i) H is a Heyting algebra iff it satisfies the strong distributive law: a ∧ VK = V(a ∧ K) 
 
(ii) For K := {b; a ∧ b = 0} the supremum VK of K is called the Heyting complement of a; 
it is denoted by a*.2 
 
(iii) An element a ∈ H is called regular if and only if a = a**.♦ 
 
Evidently, every finite distributive lattice is a Heyting algebra. For infinite distributive 
lattices, this is no longer true, however. Due to the following lemma, the class of Heyting 
algebras turns out to be a generalization of the class of Boolean algebras: 
 
(2.8) Lemma. A Heyting algebra H is a Boolean algebra if and only if a** = a for all a ∈ H.♦ 
 
Now we can state the first main result concerning the mereology of similarity structures (cf. 
Reyes and Zolfaghari (1996)): 
 
(2.9) Theorem. Let (S, ~) be a similarity structure.   
(i)   The mereological system PART(S, ~) of structural parts is a Heyting algebra that 
usually is not a Boolean algebra. 
(ii)   The mereological system PARTD(S, ~) of discrete structural parts of (S, ~) is a 
Boolean system isomorphic to PART(S).♦ 
 
Proof. Let (T, ~) be a subgraph of (S, ~). Then the Heyting complement (T*, ~T*) is defined 
as follows. Let T* be the set-theoretical complement of T in S. The restriction of the 
similarity relation ~ of S to T* defines a similarity structure ~T* on T*. Then the Heyting 
complement of (T, ~) is defined as (T*, ~T*). With these definitions, PART(S, ~) is a Heyting 
system. Examples of non-full structural parts such as (2.6) show that PART(S, ~) is in 
general not Boolean.♦ 
                                                
2 Intuitively, a* is the largest element of H that does not overlap with a, i.e., for which a ∧ a* = 0 
holds. In general, a ∧ a* = 0 does not suffice to ensure that a ∨ a* = 1. Hence, a Heyting complement 
need not be a Boolean complement in the sense of (2.5)(ii). 
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Similarity structures have appeared under many different names in philosophy, 
mathematics, computer science and related disciplines, e.g. as tolerance space, indifference 
structures, inhomogeneous sets (Carnap), or (undirected) graphs, to name a few. Moreover, 
as has often been noticed, to a large extent the theory of these structured sets may be 
developed along the lines of the theory of sets. From a modern point of view, this means to 
compare the category of sets with the category of graphs, the category of tolerance 
spaces, or however we may call the category of these structures (cf. Stout (1992), 
Lawvere and Schanuel (1996), Lawvere and Rosebrugh (2002)).  
In the general framework of category theory, every category C can be shown to come along 
with its specific mereology. This C-specific mereology ascribes to each object S of C the 
system of its subobjects (= parts) of S in C. Depending on the structure of C the structure 
of these mereological systems more or less differs from the structure of the mereological 
systems of sets, to wit, Boolean algebras. 
For the modest purposes of this paper the technical apparatus of category theory is not 
necessary. But in the long run, analytical metaphysics and formal ontology in particular 
would certainly profit from the conceptual tools of category theory and related 
developments. For some tentative steps in this direction, the reader may consult Mormann 
(2009, 2010). 
 
 
3. Structural Mereology of Complex States of Affairs. Looking at structural formulas of 
elementary chemistry such as H−O−H, H−C−H, O−O, Na−O−H on the one hand and at graphs 
of similarity structures such as (2.1) on the other, it is more or less obvious that similarity 
structures and structural formulas of chemistry are closely related to each other. One 
further definition is necessary to make this relation explicit: 
 
(3.1) Definition.  Let S1, S2, …,  Sn  be non-empty, mutually disjoint sets and  S := S1 υ S2 υ 
… υ Sn,  n = 1, 2, 3, …. Then a similarity structure (S, ~) is called an n-sorted similarity 
structure. The Si are called the sorts of (S, ~).♦ 
 
An ordinary similarity structure is just a 1-sorted similarity structure. In the following we will 
only deal with 2-sorted similarity structures but all arguments go through for n-sorted 
structures with n ≥ 3. 
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A 2-sorted similarity structure (S1 ∪ S2, ~) may be graphically represented as a “labeled” 
graph in such a way that the vertices of S1, are labeled, say, by the letter H and the vertices 
of S2 are labeled by the letter C, respectively: 
 
 
Obviously, the 2-sorted graphs of (3.2) correspond to the structure formulas of methane 
and butane, respectively. More complex molecules involving more than two sorts of atoms 
may be described analogously with the help of n-sorted graphs, n ≥ 3. 
What has been said about the mereological structure of 1-sorted similarity structures (S, ~) 
in section 2 directly applies to n-sorted similarity structures since the labeling does not 
affect the mereological structure of a graph. In other words, n-sorted similarity structures S 
give rise to mereological systems PART(S, ~) of structural parts in the same way as 1-
sorted structures do. In particular, theorem (2.9) also holds for n-sorted similarity 
structures. 
Now we are ready to apply the conceptual apparatus developed so far to calculate the 
mereological structure of complex states of affairs in detail. As an example we calculate the 
mereological structure of the complex state of affairs of being a methane molecule. 
 
(3.3) Mereological Analysis of Methane. Assume a, b, c, d, e to be thin particulars, H the 
universal hydrogen, and C the universal carbon. Define S1 = {Ha, Hb, Hc, Hd}, S2 = {Ce} and 
S := S1 ∪ S2. Denote by  the binary bonding universal, and define a similarity relation ~ on 
S by 
           ~ := D(S) ∪ {HaCe, CeHa, HbCe, CeHb, HcCe, CeHe, HdCe, CeHd} 
 
Then the similarity structure (S, ~) is the state of affairs that the particulars a, b, c, d, e 
instantiate a methane molecule such that a, b, c, and d instantiate the universal H, e 
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instantiates the universal C, and the binary bonding universal  is instantiated by the set 
{HaCe, CeHa, HbCe, CeHb, HcCe, CeHe, HdCe, CeHd}.♦ 
 
Since  is symmetric the complex state of affairs of being methane may be displayed as     
 
in the familiar way. Note that (3.4) is NOT the kind of complex states of affairs considered 
in (Armstrong 1997, 34 - 37), since the particulars that complete the bonding universal  
are the thick particulars Ha, Hb, …, Ce. In contrast, in Armstrong’s analysis, the bonding 
universal  is completed by thin particulars a, b, …, e. Hence, the partial states of affairs 
which according to his analysis involve the bonding universal are ae, be, ce, and de 
(cf. Armstrong 1997, 34). The important point is that these states of affairs are 
mereological atoms that mereologically have no further structure. In contrast, the states of 
affairs in (3.4) such as HaCe are NOT mereological atoms. They do have a non-trivial 
mereological structure, namely, they have proper parts Ha and Ce. 
The other atomic states that according to Armstrong’s analysis appear in the complex state 
methane (3.4) are Ha, Hb, Hc, Hd, and Ce. Then, according to Armstrong’s proposal, the 
mereological structure of the complex state of affairs (3.4) is the Boolean algebra P({Ha, 
Hb, Hc, Hd, Ce, ae, be, ce, de}). In general, for a molecule with n atoms and m 
bondings Armstrong’s analysis yields as the mereological structure of that molecule the 
Boolean algebra of the power set generated by n+m elements. 
Our analysis yields a different, more complex structure. Denoting the similarity structure 
(3.4) by (M, ~) the lattice PART(M, ~) of its structural parts may be calculated by using the 
definition (2.2). First, one observes that PART(M, ~) has five atoms, to wit, Ha, Hb, Hc, Hd, 
Ce. In contrast to Armstrong’s account, the states of affairs HaCe, …, HdCe are neither 
atoms nor are generated by atoms. Nevertheless they are mereologically not trivial: Using 
(2.2) one calculates 
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Hj, Ce < Hj & Ce < HjCe                        j ∈ {a, b, c, d} 
 
but obviously there is no atom that makes a difference between Hj & Ce and HjCe. Hence, 
the part HjCe of M is neither an atom nor is generated by atoms. Analogously one shows 
that parts of M such as HjCeHk (j≠ k) are neither atoms nor are generated by atoms. 
This evidences that PART(M, ~) essentially differs from the Boolean lattice that Armstrong 
obtains as the result of his mereological analysis. PART(M, ~) is a non-Boolean Heyting 
algebra.  
Emphasizing the difference between the two analysis is not to say that they are unrelated. 
The conceptual relation between Armstrong’s mereological analysis and the one proposed in 
this paper can be succinctly described as follows: given a complex state of affairs with 
similarity structure (S, ~S) Armstrong takes the number |S| of vertices (atoms) of S and the 
number |~S| of edges of (S, ~) and ascribes the Boolean algebra P({1, …, |S| +|~S|}) to the 
state. Unsurprisingly, this procedure yields a rather poor picture of (S, ~S), as is evidenced 
by the fact that for many essentially different molecules it gives the same mereological 
structure. A particularly pertinent example that has been amply discussed is the case of 
butane and isobutane. The structure formula of butane was given in (3.2)(ii), that of iso-
butane is 
 
 
As is easily counted the sum of the number of atoms and the number of bonds of butane 
and isobutane is 14(atoms) + 13(bonds) = 27. Hence, according to Armstrong’s analysis 
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the mereological systems of these molecules are isomorphic to the Boolean algebra P({1, 
…, 27}).  
On the other hand, the 2-sorted graphs (3.2)(ii) and (3.5) of butane and isobutane are 
clearly non-isomorphic. Consequently the mereological systems PART(Butane) and 
PART(Isobutane) are different. This does not exclude that these systems have isomorphic 
subsystems as is actually the case for butane and isobutane. The graphs of butane and 
isobutane have in common the discrete 2-sorted graph consisting of four C-states and ten 
H-states (see (3.2)(ii) and (3.5): 
 
 
In other words, PARTD(Butane) = PARTD(Isobutane) = P({1, 2, …, 14}). Moreover, by defi-
nition P({1, 2, …, 14}) is a subalgebra of Armstrong’s algebra P({1, …, 27}). Nevertheless 
the full mereological systems PART(Butane) and PART(Isobutane) are non-isomorphic since  
the full mereological systems PART(Butane) and PART(Isobutane) are non-isomorphic. This 
can be deduced from the fact that these systems contain different non-discrete states of 
affairs as parts, for instance the full subgraphs 
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are non-isomorphic, since the graph of the first one contains the element Cu3 that has three 
different neighbors while this is not the case for the graph of the second one. 
Thus, even if one concurs with Lewis that “it’s no good thinking that a structural universal is 
composed of simpler universals which are literally parts of it” (Lewis 1986, 212), this does 
not mean that it does not make perfectly good sense to think of a complex state of affairs 
as being composed of simpler states of affairs. These simpler states are literally parts of the 
complex state. Hence, there is no need to introduce structural universals for describing the 
structure of complex state of affairs (pace Bigelow and Pargetter (1989)) mereology alone 
suffices. The mereological structure takes into account non-discrete states of affairs such 
as FaGb as parts of complex states of affairs; these parts distinguish between different 
complex states of affairs having the same discrete parts - as is the case for butane and 
isobutane. Lewis’s alleged difficulty that different structural universals were to be 
composed of the same basic universals does not arise due to the different non-discrete 
parts that make a difference between isomere states of affairs. 
One may admit structural universals as a convenient façon de parler but they lack any 
ontological weight. Alleged structural universals such as H2O or CH4 that in a superficial 
analysis of water or methane seem to play an analogous role to the one that basic 
universals such as H or C play in the analysis of hydrogen atoms or carbon atoms Ha or Ce, 
are to be considered as a convenient shorthand of the full mereological structures that 
actually do the real work. 
 
 
4. Formal Relations and Arrangement Universals. After having presented in some detail our 
proposal of how to elucidate the structure of complex states of affairs a brief comparison 
with some other attempts to cope with the problem of “structural universals” may be in 
order. Particularly pertinent in this regard are Pagés (2002) and Kalhat (2008). Both 
authors contend that Armstrong’s factual ontology should be enriched by some further 
element in order to distinguish between different structural universals that are composed of 
the “same” simple universals. Both take that extra element to be a relation. In contrast, the 
account of the present paper relies on a distinction that is already present in Armstrong’s 
original approach, namely, the distinction between relational states of affairs that only 
involve thin particulars such as Rab, and relational states of affairs that involve thick 
particulars such as Fa B Gb, respectively. Hence, even before we delve into the technical 
details one can say that our approach is ontologically more austere and closer to 
Armstrong’s original account than that of Pagés or Kalhat. 
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Pagés calls the extra element that he introduces to cope with the problems of structural 
universals, “formal relations” (cf. Pagés (2008, 218)). Formal relations are designed to take 
care of the numerical identity and difference of the particulars involved in the 
exemplifications of their constituent properties and relations. Formal relations provide the 
relational description of the n-sorted graphs which describe the structure of complex states 
of affairs can be described. Pagés uses the following elementary example to show how this 
recipe works: Let A and C be monadic universals that are instantiated by A-atoms and C-
atoms, respectively. 
Now consider two molecular states of affairs D and E represented by the 2-sorted graphs: 
 
 
Filling in the particulars x, y, and z and representing the bonding  by the binary universal B 
the states of affairs corresponding to (D) and (E) have the following relational descriptions: 
 
 
Denote the triadic relation of (4.2)(D) by R and the triadic relation of (4.2)(E) by S. Then 
the structural properties of molecules of type D and E can be analyzed as follows: 
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(4.3) Ontological Analysis of D- and E-molecules (Pagés 2008, 218). Let m be a molecule. 
 
(i)   m is a D-molecule if and only if there are three particulars a1, a2, a3 constituting m 
and different from each other such that the sequence <a1, a2, a3> instantiates the 
first order formal relation R. 
(ii)   m is an E-molecule if and only if there are three particulars a1, a2, a3 constituting m 
and different from each other such that the sequence <a1, a2, a3> instantiates the 
first order formal relation S.♦ 
 
Evidently, appropriate “formal relations” can be used to describe more complex states of 
affairs such as methane, butane, or isobutane and their differences. Equally evident is that 
Pagés’s formal relations are just implicit descriptions of n-sorted graphs. In contrast to the 
present approach, however, in Pagés’s account the mereological aspects of complex states 
of affairs remain in the dark. Moreover, as Kalhat remarks (Kalhat 2008, 75), one may 
doubt, whether formal relations are firmly rooted in the conceptual praxis of chemistry. 
 
Now let us have a closer look on Kalhat’s attempt to come to terms with structural 
universals and their role in the constitution of complex states of affairs (cf. (Kalhat 2008). 
First of all, one should note that Kalhat ignores the repetition problem, i.e. the problem of 
how one can make sense of the assumption that in the alleged structural universals of 
methane, butane, and the like simple universals such as hydrogen and carbon can appear 
several times. Granted this, for Kalhat the road to structural universals is quite short (cf. 
Kalhat 2008, 67). Starting from a complex state of affairs 
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the structural universal of being butane is obtained by replacing the particulars a, b, … m, n 
of (4.4) by variables x1, …, x14, and the chemical bonding between the atoms of (5.4) by 
some kind of abstract bonding: 
 
Kalhat proposes to consider structures such as (4.5) as structural universals, but he does 
not give any explanation what the ontological status of these entities might be. As it 
seems, it is not the same as the one that ordinary universals enjoy. On the one hand, there 
are ordinary monadic universals such as H or C, on the other hand, according to (4.5) there 
are objects such as Hx, Hy, Cz and the like, which, of course, are to be identified somehow 
with H or C, respectively. Be this as it may, Kalhat remains silent about what the parts of a 
structural universal such as (4.5) may be. Perhaps, just the Hxi and Cxj, i, j = 1, 2, ... . Since 
he explicitly does not want to distinguish between parts and constituents of states of 
affairs, another option may be that the parts of (4.5) are H, C, and the xi, i = 1, 2, ..., (cf. 
Kalhat 2008, 75). But then he runs into Lewis’s difficulty that one and the same part, such 
as H and C, appear several time in one and the same whole. Thus, the mereological 
structure of his structural universals remains unclear. Things become worse, when he 
introduces as a further part of (4.4) what he calls the “arrangement universal” being 
butane-wise arranged. In our terminology, this is just the abstract 2-sorted graph (S1 υ S2, 
~) corresponding to (4.5), obtained by replacing the universals H and C by abstract labels. 
Finally, he postulates that the similarity structure (S1 υ S2, ~) is to be considered as a part 
of the structural universal being butane. 
In sum, then, the mereological structure of Kalhat’s structural universals remains quite 
obscure. His “arrangement parts” suspiciously resemble Aristotelian forms, and in particular 
his approach is of no help to elucidate the formal theory of complex states of affairs with 
general structural theories such as mereology, graph theory or the theory of similarity 
structures. 
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5. Concluding Remarks. The aim of this paper was to elucidate the mereological structure of 
complex states of affairs, or, more modestly, to elucidate the mereological structure of 
some complex states of affairs that occur in elementary chemistry. Employing conceptual 
tools from graph theory, lattice theory, and the theory of relational systems it has been 
shown that we don’t need structural universals for the constitution of complex states of 
affairs. Rather, non-classical Heyting mereology suffices. That is to say that not all parts of 
complex states of affairs are joins (suprema) of discrete atomic states. Complex states of 
affairs use to have non-discrete states as parts like Fa−Gb. The existence of these states 
strongly influences the mereological structure of complex states. It ushers us outside the 
realm of classical Boolean mereology. For instance, already the mereological system 
PART(Fa−Gb) is a non-Boolean Heyting algebra of five elements. 
In this paper we only considered complex states of affairs with one binary bonding universal 
 whose mereology turned out to be isomorphic to the mereology of similarity structures 
or, equivalently, simple graphs. Our approach may be easily generalized to complex states 
of affairs that involve more than one binary bonding universal. This amounts to the 
investigation of graphs with different sorts of edges. Further generalizations dealing with n-
ary (n ≥ 3) instead of binary bonding universals are possible leading to the study of 
hypergraphs instead of ordinary graphs. 
Since graphs qua similarity structures are structured sets, their mereology can be 
developed along the lines of the mereology of sets (cf. Lewis 1991). The outcome is that 
the mereological structures of complex states of affairs are Heyting mereological systems. 
Structural universals have no essential role in this approach. Formulas such as H2O or CH4 
that apparently refer to them, are useful “incomplete symbols” somewhat in Russell’s sense, 
but they do not belong to the basic ontological furniture of a world of states of affairs. A 
factual ontology can do without them, provided one is prepared to go beyond the confines 
of classical Boolean mereology admitting more general mereological structures such as 
Heyting algebras. 
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